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Abstract: In this paper we proposed two identification 
schemes based on the root problem. The proposed 
schemes are secure against passive attacks assuming 
that the root problem (RP)  is hard in braid groups. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The idea of using the braid group as a platform for cryptosystems was introduced in [2]. 
In recent years have emerged several proposals for secure cryptographical schemes using 
noncommutative groups, in particular Artin’s braid groups [1, 2, 4, 5, and 7]. Braid 
groups are more complicated than Abelian groups, and are not too complicated to be 
worked with. These two characteristics make braid group a natural choice. In fact, the 
Conjugacy Problem (CP) and the Root Problem (RP) in braid groups are algorithmically 
difficult, and it consequently provide one-way functions. We use it to propose two 
identification scheme based on Root Problem over a braid group.  
It is well known that an identification scheme is an important and useful 
cryptographic tool. The identification scheme is an interactive protocol where a prover, 
P, tries to convince a verifier, V, of his identity. Only P knows the secret value 
corresponding to his public one, and the use of this secret value allows P to convince V 
of its identity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  We present a brief introduction of 
braid groups in section 2. In section 3, we define identification schemes. In section 4, we 
present our identification schemes, and we give a proof of security and zero-knowledge 
for our schemes. The paper ends with conclusion. 
 
2. Braid Groups 
 
Emil Artin [3] in 1925 defined Bn, the braid group of index n, using following generators 
and relations: Consider the 
generators 121 ,...,, −nσσσ ,whereσ i  represents the braid in which the (i+1)st  string 
crosses over the ith string while all other strings remain uncrossed. 
 The definining relations are 
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  (1)         jiforijji −= σσσσ > 1 
          (2)    1=−= jiforjijiji σσσσσσ . 
 The reader is referred to any textbook about braids for a geometrical interpretation of 
each element of the group Bn by an n-strand braid in the usual sense. The braid 
))().......(.........)(..........( 121221121 σσσσσσσσσ −−=∆ nn  is called the 
fundamental braid. nearly commutes with any braid b. In fact∆ ( )∆=∆ bb τ ,      
where :: nn BB →τ ( ) ini −=σστ  is an automorphism. Since τ2 is the identity map, ∆2 
truly commutes with any braid. A subword of the fundamental braid ∆ is called a 
permutation braid and the set of all permutation braids is in one-to-one correspondence 
with the set ∑ of permutations onn { }1,...,1,0 −n . For example, ∆ is the permutation 
sending i to n-i. The word length of a permutation n-braid is
2
)1( −≤ nn . The descant set 
( )πD of a permutation π is defined by ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1+>= iiiD πππ .Any braid b can be 
written uniquely as  where u is an integer, l
ub πππ ...21∆= iπ  are permutation braids such 
that ∆≠iπ  and ( )1+iD π ⊂  ( )1−iD π . This unique decomposition of a braid b is called 
a left canonical form. 
All the braids in this paper are supposed to be in the left-canonical form. For example, 
for a,b∈  Bn, ab means the left-canonical form of ab and so it is hard to guess its factors a 
or b from ab. 
If b is a non-trivial and e≥2 is an integer, then be is never identity. In other words, the 
braid groups are torsion-free.  
For given y∈Bn and e 2 finding x such that y = x≥ e is called root problem (RP). 
It is proved in [8] that RP is decidable but it is computationally infeasible when braids of 
a sufficient size are considered. 
 
3. Identification Schemes 
 
An identification scheme or entity authentication protocol, allows one party to gain 
assurances that the identity of another is as declared. It is used to prevent impersonation. 
 2
 It is an interactive protocol which involves a prover or claimant P and a verifier 
V. In general, P tries to convince the verifier V of his identity. The verifier is presented 
with, or presumes beforehand, the purported identity of the prover. The goal is to 
corroborate that the identity of the prover is indeed P. Only P knows the secret value 
corresponding to his public one, and it is the proper use of this secret value which allows  
P to convince V of the identity of P. 
  The objectives of an identification protocol include the following. 
1. In the case of honest parties P and V, P is able to successfully authenticate himself to 
V, i.e., V will complete the protocol having accepted P’s identity. 
 2. (Transferability) V cannot reuse an identification exchange with P so as to successfully 
impersonate P to a third party A. 
3. (Impersonation) The probability is negligible that any party C distinct from P, carrying 
out the protocol and playing the role of P, can cause V to accept P’s identity. 
4. The previous points hold even if: a polynomial large number of previous authentication 
between P and V have been observed; the adversary A has participated in previous 
protocol executions with either or both P and V; and multiple instances of the protocol, 
possibly initiated by C, may be run simultaneously. 
 
 
4. The Proposed Schemes 
 
Here we propose two identification schemes. For both the schemes, the initial setup is as 
follows:  
Let Bn be a braid group where RP is infeasible. As mentioned earlier, all the braids in Bn 
are assumed to be in the left canonical form. Thus for a, b in Bn, it is hard to guess a or b 
from ab. We assume that n is even, and denote by LBn (resp.UBn) the subgroup of Bn 
generated by 1 1
2
,..., ,nσ σ −  i.e., braids where the n/2 lower strands only are braided ( resp. 
in the subgroup generated by 11
2
,...,n nσ σ −+ ). We know that every element in LBn 
commutes with every element in UBn. We also take H as a fixed collision-free hash 
function on Bn. 
Scheme I :Key Generation 
P generates private and public keys as follows: 
(a) P choose two integers r 2, and s 2; ≥ ≥
(b) P chooses a∈LBn, and b∈UBn such that RP for a, b is hard enough; 
(c) P computes X = arbs; 
(d) P’s public key is (X,r,s); and the secret key is the pair (a, b). 
Authentication  
(a) V choose c∈UBn, d∈LBn, and sends the challenge Y = crds to P. 
(b) P sends the response Z = H (arYbs) to V. 
(c) V checks Z = H (crXds). 
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  V   P 
Y
c∈UBn, d∈LBn
     Y = crds
Z
Z = H(arYbs) 
   Figure1: Proposed Scheme I
 
Security: 
Completeness: Assume that, at step 2(b), P sent Z’. Then V accepts P’s key if and only 
if we have Z’ = H(crXds).The latter relation is equivalent to 
Z’ = H(cr(arbs)ds)…………..(1) 
By hypothesis, a,d ∈LBn while b,c∈UBn, so ac = ca and bd = db. Therefore (1) is 
equivalent to Z’ = H(ar(crds)bs), i.e., to Z’ = Z. 
Soundness: Assume a cheater C is accepted with non-negligible probability. This means 
that C can compute H(crXds) with non-negligible probability. As H is supposed to be an 
ideal hash function, this means that C can compute a braid z satisfying H(z)= H(crXds) 
with non-negligible probability. There are two possibilities: either we have z = crXds, 
which contradicts the hypothesis that the RP for c and d is hard, or z c≠ rXds, which 
means that C and V are able to find a collision for H, contradicting the hypothesis that H 
is collision free. 
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Consider the probabilistic Turing machine defined as 
follows: it chooses random braids c and d using the same drawing as the honest verifier, 
and outputs the instances (c,d,H(crXds)). Then, the instance generated by this simulator 
follows the same probability distribution as the ones generated by the interactive pair 
(P,V). 
 
Scheme II: In this scheme the initial setup is the same. However P generates his keys as 
follows: 
Key Generation 
1. P generates a sufficiently complicated braid s in Bn. 
2. P Choose two integer e 2, and f≥ 2. ≥
3. P Choose a∈LBn, and computes X = aesaf. 
4. The public key is Pub = < n, e, f, s, X >, and the secret key is < a >. 
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Authentication 
Protocol consists of k-times challenge-response protocol where k is security 
parameter as usual identification protocol. The two pass challenge-response protocol 
is described as follows: 
1. V chooses b in UBn, and sends the challenge Y = besbf to P. 
2.   P sends the response Z = H(aeYaf) to V. 
3.   V accepts P’s proof of identity if and only if Z = H (beXbf) and reject otherwise. 
 
  V   P 
Y        
b∈UBn  
Y=besbf
Z
Z = H(arYaf) 
   Figure2: Proposed Scheme II 
 
Security: 
Completeness: Assume that, at Phase II (2), P sends T. The V accepts P’s proof if and 
only if T = H(beXbf), i.e., if and only if T = H(be(aesaf)bf). By hypothesis a∈LBn while 
b∈UBn, so ab = ba. Therefore T = H(ae(besbf)af) = H(aeYaf) = Z. 
Soundness: Assume a cheater C is accepted with non-negligible probability. This means 
that C can compute H(beXbf) with non-negligible probability. As H is supposed to be an 
ideal hash function, this means that C can compute a braid z satisfying H(z)= H(beXbf) 
with non-negligible probability. There are two possibilities: either we have z = beXbf, 
which contradicts the hypothesis that the RP for b is hard, or z≠  beXbf, which means that 
C and V are able to find a collision for H, contradicting the hypothesis that H is collision 
free. 
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Consider the probabilistic Turing machine defined as 
follows: it chooses random braids b using the same drawing as the honest verifier, and 
outputs the instances (b, H(beXbf)).Then, the instance generated by this simulator follows 
the same probability distribution as the ones generated by the interactive pair (P, V). 
 
Conclusion: In this paper, we have proposed some identification schemes specially 
designed for braid groups. Our schemes are two-pass protocol based on RP and we give 
security proof of our schemes. 
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